Thomas Green and William
Pepicello
The Proverb and Riddle as Folk Enthymemes1
The relationship of proverbs to riddles has been
expressed traditionally in terms of one basic similarity and
one basic difference. Both genres generally are held to be
grounded in metaphor; however, the proverb metaphor is
invoked to clarify, while the riddle image is invoked to
confuse. This latter difference is frequently related to a
structural distinction between the two genres, namely the
statement format of proverbs vs. the question format of
riddles.
Alan Dundes (1975), however, suggests that proverbs and
riddles share two important structural similarities. First,
he points out that both genres contain descriptive elements
embedded in topic-comment constructions.2 Second, both genres have two general types, oppositional and
non-oppositional. In the former category are proverbs like
"No news is good news" and riddles like "What has eyes and
cannot see? A potato." In the latter category are proverbs
like "Times is money" and riddles like "Thirty-two horses on
a red hill/Now they stomp/Now they chomp/Now they stand
still. Teeth." In each case, the proverb or riddle consists
of a descriptive element, or topic, and a comment. In the
case of riddles, the topic must be guessed, while the topic
in proverbs, by virtue of contextual information, is assumed
to be shared by speaker and listener.
Dundes points out (p. 51) another feature of context; it
often dictates whether a given text is interpreted as a
riddle or a proverb. In the specific case of proverbs,
Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1973) underscores the
importance of context for interpretation of a given use of a
proverb, and explores sources of potential ambiguity in
proverbs. Among other sources of ambiguity she notes that
proverbs express relative rather than absolute truth, and
that the situations that provoke the usage of a proverb may
be evaluated in more than one way. Michael D. Lieber (1984)
focuses on the analogical aspects of proverbs, building on
Seitel's (1969) demonstration that the analogic relationship
between the proverb image and the real-world situation to
which it is applied is ambigous according to context. Lieber
extends this analysis to show that the analogic structure of
proverb texts may vary even within a single context, i.e.,
that a given proverb uttered in a specific context may be
subject to multiple interpretations depending on how the
speaker and listener analyze the analogy inherent in the
proverb.
Lieber also relates the ability to use a proverb
persuasively to the repertoire of rhetorical strategies
found in a given culture. In this paper we shall expand upon
the notion of proverbs as a rhetorical form, focussing on
the relation of form and function. We shall then claim that
the relationship of form to function that exists in proverbs
holds also for riddles, thus reinforcing Dundes'
observation. This common relationship also reveals proverbs
and riddles to be similar rhetorical forms with similar
functions in the culture.
Lieber correctly points out that analogic reasoning in
general is subject to the vagaries of ambiguity. He argues
persuasively, for example, that the pair theory:scientists can be matched reasonably to the
following pairs:
- hammer:carpenter
- blueprint:architect
- blueprint:carpenter
- theatrical production:critic
- portofolio:career
- (1984:427)
The full text of this
article is published in De
Proverbio - Issue 11:2000 & Issue
12:2000, an
electronic book, available from amazon.com and other leading Internet booksellers.
We begin our discussion by examining how riddles function
with reference to basic pragmatic aspects of normal
communication. A fundamental pragmatic principle governing
utilitarian conversation has been defined by H.P. Grice
(1975) as the Cooperative Principle. This principle consists
of four maxims:
- Quantity: give the right amount of
information
- Quality:: try to make your contribution one that is
true
- Relation: be relevant
- Manner: be perspicacious
In the riddle performance one assumes that maxims 2 and 3
are in effect by virtue of the rules of a riddle performance
itself. I.e., if 2 and 3 are not in effect, a riddle cannot
be potentially soluble. One also assumes that maxims 1 and 4
are flouted in the following way. The riddler presents only
minimally sufficient information in the riddle to allow a
respondent to discover its logic, i.e., the riddler presents
his text so that it is potentially (though generally not
readily) "soluble." However, the key to the logic of the
riddle is presented in a covert manner, i.e., it is not
perspicacious.
Consider, for example, the following riddles:
- What's black and white and red/read all
over? Newspaper.
- What fruit is on a penny? A date.
These riddles, and many more in Anglo-American culture,
play on linguistic ambiguity for their wit. In 1) the
ambiguity is between the simple adjective red and the
irregular past participle of the verb to read. In 2)
we find simple lexical ambiguity, wherein the utterance date may refer to either a fruit or a designated year
stamped on a coin. In both cases, the question-answer
sequence contains sufficient information for the riddler to
discern the logic (i.e., wit) by which the sequence makes
sense. However, this logic is not apparent and requires that
the riddler detect the crucially ambiguous element
(red/read and date in the examples) in order
to "get" the riddle.
Following Geoffery Leech (1983:2ff.), we can summarize
our analysis to this point as follows. The rules of grammar
which determine form (locutionary acts) are fundamentally
conventional and account for the question-and-answer form of
riddles. The principles of pragmatics are fundamentally
non-conventional, i.e., they are motivated in terms of
conversational goals. In the case of riddle performance, the
goal is to bring all participants in the interaction to an
understanding of and agreement about the special logic of
individual riddles. Clearly this goal is not the same as,
nor an inversion of, that of questions, which is to elicit
information. Thus, a pragmatic analysis of riddles indicates
that they do not function as questions.
What a pragmatic analysis reveals is that riddles seem to
function as enthymemes in the same way as proverbs. That is,
the riddler performs an utterance which contains a
non-scientific logic and a non-manifest key, the logical
link which the riddlee seeks to discover. The form of the
riddle is rhetorical in that the special logic is only one
of several which may be applied to the riddle (since riddles
function by ambiguity, either grammatical or metaphorical),
and so is probabilistic. In order for the riddle act to be
considered successful, riddler and riddlee must both
understand and agree to the viability of this logic.
The enthymeme patterns which emerge from both proverbs
and riddles reinforce the structural similarities noted by
Dundes in these two genres. Moreover, such an analysis as we
have proposed allows for extension in other directions. To
present only one example, it explains why many riddles do
not adopt a question-answer format, yet allows us to relate
this type of riddle to those which do adopt the
question-answer format. Simply, if riddles do not have the
illocutionary force of questions, they are not constrained
to be realized through interrogative syntax. Indeed, logical
progressions of the type represented in riddles are as
easily presented in the form of declarative statements.
However, another classical form of logical argumentation is
precisely that which proceeds by a series of questions and
answers which seek not to illicit information so much as to
construct an argument, viz. the Socratic Method.
NOTES
Previously published in Proverbium 3 (1986), pp. 33-45.
Permission to publish this article granted by Proverbium (Editor: Prof. Wolfgang Mieder, University
of Vermont, USA).
1 An earlier version of this
essay was presented at the 1984 meetings of the American
Folklore Society in San Diego, California.
2 See also Georges and
Dundes (1963:113).
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Thomas Green
Department of English
Texas A&M Unversity
College Station, Texas 77843
USA
William Pepicello
Department of English
Hahnemann University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
USA
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